Within Rwanda’s “industrial” sector, artisanal and small-scale mining represents the fastest growing sub-sector. Annual mineral exports in recent years surpassed the US$ 100-200 million mark making 3T minerals the most important Rwandan export product (well above the value of the traditional export mainstays, tea and coffee). In 2013 and 2014, coltan concentrate exports in the range of 2,300-2,500 tons (corresponding to ca. 600 tons contained tantalum pentoxide) made Rwanda the largest coltan exporter in the world, although this trend is not historically representative. By volume, cassiterite constitutes the most important mineral export, with annual export tonnages of 4,000-6,000 tons of cassiterite concentrate (ca. 2,500-3,500 tons contained tin). Embedded into national fiscal governance reforms, the state’s revenue potential from the mining sector is expected to increase with the recent introduction of mining royalties. Care has to be taken, however, to balance the sector’s different economic impact factors (e.g., re-investment deficits or financial strain through international conflict mineral sourcing practices).

While Rwanda hosts a significant national mining sector with hundreds of legitimate small- and medium-scale mines, different mineral traders and exporters have also been implicated in the trafficking of smuggled 3T mineral concentrates from the eastern DRC. This development started at a minor scale in the late 1960s with the partial liberalization of artisanal mineral trading in both DRC and Rwanda. It was inflated and catalyzed substantially through the involvement of Rwanda-controlled armed forces in the Second Congo War (1998-2001). Since then, for areas under their influence, criminal networks linked to pro-Rwandan armed groups in the eastern DRC have often resorted to smuggling conflict-related 3T minerals from the DRC into Rwanda where these minerals were then officially exported. Since 2011, the intensity of artisanal 3T mining in the eastern DRC started to decline due to a number of factors, the most prominent one being large-scale migration of Congolese artisanal miners from the 3T into the gold sector. Since the large majority of Congolese artisanal miners is now active in gold, this sector has become the most attractive target for illegal taxation by militias and DRC army groups. Therefore, conflict risks associated with the Congolese 3T sector and, by implications, of 3T minerals smuggled through Rwanda, have decreased significantly. This is further accentuated through the concomitant progressive institutionalization of supply chain due diligence measures to manage conflict risks in the 3T sector. Therefore, while DRC-Rwanda 3T mineral smuggling risks continue to apply at a certain scale, they now mainly refer to an economic governance problem, rather than implying a sustained contribution to regional conflict, as further discussed here.

Illustration of 3T mineral supply chain typical for Rwanda and other countries of the region Source: BGR

Mineral certification and due diligence serve a dual-objective in Rwanda: protecting the international credibility of legitimately produced 3T minerals and curtailing both smuggling risks and theft. Mineral smuggling refers to an external origin (from neighboring countries such as the DRC and Burundi) of 3T minerals exported from Rwanda, while theft involves Rwandan mineral producers or traders illegally buying or stealing minerals originating from other mines inside Rwanda. Rwanda is the only country of the region whose 3T minerals enjoyed almost unrestricted international market access since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. The mineral price impacts resulting from this situation generate regional 3T smuggling incentives which need to be countered through appropriate due diligence application. Managing the latter may only be effective if an economically sustainable regional level playing field on supply chain due diligence is established, with mineral market access opportunities to be developed for Rwanda’s neighboring countries as well.